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Private Equity as  
an Alternative Corporate Restructuring Scheme:  
Does Private Equity Increase  
the Operating Performance of PE-Backed Firms?  
By JAHYUN KOO* 
There has been a surge of interest in private equity as an alternative 
corporate restructuring scheme to complement the current 
institutional forms such as workouts and court receivership. By 
empirically examining whether private equity in Korea can improve 
investee companies, we find that while private equity in Korea did not 
sacrifice the long-term growth potential of investee firms, it did not 
improve their profitability (e.g. ROA, ROE, and ROS) or growth (e.g. 
sales growth) either. Both the negative correlation between business 
performance and firm age and our empirical results showing that 
young firms were favored by private equity for investment imply that 
Korean private equity may perform as growth capital, similar to 
venture capital rather than as buyouts for corporate restructuring. 
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business performance, buyouts, growth capital 
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   I. Introduction 
 
he Korean economy has continued to show sluggish growth since 2010, and 
company profitability levels have deteriorated among Korean firms. In 
addition, the number of marginal firms, termed “zombie companies,” has 
increased. Accordingly, preemptive corporate restructuring must take place before a 
large number of corporate insolvencies can be realized (Bank of Korea 2015; Jeong 
2014; Jeong and Nam 2015). The country's current leading corporate restructuring 
schemes include corporate structure improvements, “workouts,” and corporate 
rehabilitation proceedings, also known as “court receiverships.” However, these 
corporate restructuring procedures led by institutions have had limited effects on 
business regeneration as they are basically different forms of ex post corporate
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restructurings, as the processes are conducted after corporate distress has 
progressed significantly, thereby resulting in considerable costs being incurred, 
such as a large number of employment adjustments and conflict of interests among 
stakeholders. Financially advanced countries, including the U.S., actively 
undertake ex ante corporate restructuring in an effort to eliminate inefficiencies in 
companies prior to corporate failures, also enacting post-restructuring processes for 
insolvent companies by utilizing the capital market and, in particular, private 
equity. Though the opinion that private equity should be actively engaged in 
corporate restructuring as a complementary corporate restructuring scheme for 
government-led initiatives is gaining popularity in Korea (Kim and Bin 2012), few 
studies have attempted to test whether Korean private equity can perform such 
roles empirically and to determine the policy options for revitalizing private equity 
as an alternative corporate restructuring procedure or invigorating private equity 
industry itself. This study attempts to fill this gap. 
Whether private equity can assume the functions of alternative corporate 
restructuring schemes is eventually determined by whether private equity can 
increase the value of the companies in which it invests. While research continues 
on how business performance has changed since private equity investing has been 
actively carried out overseas (e.g., Kaplan 1989; Smith 1990; Cohn and Towery 
2014), few studies have been done in Korea given its short history of private 
equity. This paper empirically investigates how the operating performance of PE-
backed firms oriented toward profitability and growth has changed since firms 
accepted private equity investment. In particular, we carried out an event study 
which statistically tests changes in operating performance levels between business 
performances levels before and after a firm accepts private equity investment for 
the period from 2006 to 2012. We analyzed firm performance while deleting 
outliers and adjusting industry average levels to enhance robustness. We also ran a 
regression model to estimate whether the characteristics of private equity have had 
an impact on the profitability of PE-backed firms. In addition, we made use of 
propensity score matching for 2012, a year with relatively many PE-backed firms, 
to complement the results of the event study. Finally, we draw implications from 
the perspective of policy and the private equity industry. 
The results of the event study and those of the statistical test demonstrate that 
private equity in Korea has been unable to improve profitability (e.g., ROA, ROE, 
and ROS) and growth (e.g., sales growth), although it does not seem to affect the 
long-term growth potential of the investee companies in terms of their investment 
activities, financial stability, and employment levels. Furthermore, the negative 
relationship between business performance and the age of firms, and the fact that 
younger firms have been favored by private equity with regard to investment 
choices, both suggest that private equity in Korea may not be in the form of 
buyouts (which serve as a corporate restructuring vehicle) but rather as growth 
capital (acting as venture capital). One of the reasons private equity could not 
demonstrate the ability to create value in its portfolio is that private equity firms 
have not had enough opportunities to build up such a capability owing to their short 
history. Different corporate restructuring market conditions existed compared to 
those immediately after the foreign exchange crisis, along with governmental 
regulation and excessive intervention. Therefore, the government should deregulate 
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to foster dynamism and innovativeness among Korean private equity. The private 
equity industry itself should also strengthen its capacity through various efforts 
(e.g., obtaining professional management teams). Finally, private equity funds must 
grow before they can carry out market-friendly corporate restructuring given the 
likely increase in the level of demand for corporate restructuring in the future, 
especially for large companies.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the 
impact of private equity investments on business performances levels by reviewing 
the literature in this area. Section III describes our data, and Section IV explores 
whether private equity firms in Korea have improved the operating performance 
levels of their investee companies. We analyze and discuss the empirical results in 
Section V, and Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. The Impact of Private Equity Investment on Business Performance 
 
Whether private equity can take on the role of alternative corporate restructuring 
schemes eventually depends on whether private equity can increase the value of a 
company in which it invests. Both theoretical and empirical studies have actively 
been carried out in an effort to examine whether private equity increases the value 
of the firms in the portfolio. Theoretically, it is argued that private equity can 
improve the operations of supported firms by reducing agency costs (Jensen 1986, 
1989). Private equity adjusts manger incentives to meet the interests of executives 
such that improvements in the operating performance of a firm are a benefit for 
them. They also closely monitor the firms in which they have invested by actively 
joining the board of directors and taking part in proceedings. From a practical 
perspective, private equity has the ability to improve the operations of firms 
through what are known as the 4Cs: capabilities, clarity, culture, and capital 
(Private Equity Council 2015).1 
Empirical research on whether private-equity-backed firms show improved 
operations has been vigorous internationally. Kaplan (1989) examined changes in 
the business performances levels of 76 instances of large management buyouts of 
public companies between 1980 and 1986, finding evidence which showed that 
within three years after the transaction, operating income, cash flow and market 
value all show improvements. He argued that enhanced performance arose not due 
to cost reductions by cutting jobs but as a result of an increase in efficiency through 
enhanced incentive measures. Smith (1990) and Smart and Waldfogel (1994) also 
showed substantial improvements in operating performance levels after U.S. 
management buyouts in the 1980s. By investigating the changes in operating 
performance between the time periods prior to and after private equity investments, 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) found substantial increases in the profitability of 
the reverse leveraged buyouts, referring to firms that have completed an initial 
public offering under a leveraged buyout.  
 
1In the same context, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) argued that private equity enhances the value of the 
investees through three actions—financial engineering, governance engineering, and operational engineering—
which are not necessarily mutually exclusive. 
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More recent papers also confirm that private equity plays a positive role in 
improving firms in which investments have been made. Guo, Hotchkiss, and Song 
(2011) delved into whether leveraged buyouts of 192 firms between 1990 and 2006 
created value, finding empirical evidence corroborating the claim that public-to-
private companies show improvements with regard to EBITDA/sales by 11% in 
comparison to a matched sample of firms that had not been taken private. Cohn and 
Towery (2014), making use of U.S. corporate tax return data on private firm 
buyouts between 1995 and 2009, provided evidence that private firms acquired in 
private equity buyouts go through substantial operational increases in the post-
buyout period, both in terms of operating performance and growth. They argued 
that private equity creates value in the portfolio firms either by leading to 
operational turnarounds of struggling firms or by relaxing financing constraints that 
limit the growth of healthier firms.  
Meanwhile, in contrast to claims that private equity opportunistically attempts to 
increase the operating value of acquired firms either by stripping the firm, reducing 
investments, or slashing large numbers of jobs rather than making efforts 
ultimately to create value, a number of empirical papers have shown the opposite. 
Smith (1990) found significant evidence that 58 buyout firms showed increases in 
operating returns when comparing the years before and after the buyouts. These 
positive changes in operating performance levels were not the result of layoffs or 
reductions in expenditures for R&D or equipment. Davis et al. (2014) argued that 
private equity raises the total factor productivity of the target firms by divesting the 
less productive business sectors and acquiring more productive ones. With respect 
to employment, Boucly et al. (2009) demonstrated increases in employment by 13 
percent when comparing the three years before and four years after buyouts for 
French buyout firms. In addition, Davis et al. (2011) found that the net relative job 
losses at target firms were less than 1 percent of initial employment, owing to the 
rapid reallocation of jobs across establishments within the target firms. Finally, 
Amess and Wright (2007) found that buyouts in the UK brought about modest 
declines in employment.  
In comparison to western countries, which have a long history of private equity, 
allowing for active research to access whether private equity can enhance the 
business performance of target firms, few studies have investigated the effect of 
private equity on the target value of firms in Asia. Kim and Cho (2009), utilizing 
29 samples from 2004 to 2006, estimated that private equity investment has a 
positive effect on current ratios, risk, and on the ratio of net income to net sales for 
firms. Park et al. (2006) analyzed value changes in firms which maintained 
business relationships with First Bank after First Bank was acquired by overseas 
private equity. They found evidence that the acquisition of what was a domestic 
bank by overseas private equity had negative effects on the value of firms with 
which First Bank had a business relationship. Recently, Song (2015) conducted 
event studies of 43 companies which had received private equity investments and 
which were listed on KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2006 to 2011. Song explored 
through t-tests whether private equity investment had helped to improve the 
business performance of the target firms and argued that private equity had a 
positive effect on the firms’ investment activities, productivity levels, and PBR. He 
also argued that private equity investment had a negative effect on profitability, 
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dividends, and employment, although the empirical results were not statistically 
significant. 
 
III. Data 
 
This study uses data reported to the Financial Supervisory Service of Korea by 
private equity firms.2 We analyzed companies listed on KOSPI and KOSDAQ 
targeted by private equity firms from 2006 to 2012. We utilized 70 sample 
observations in our analysis of companies that had received investments from 
private equity companies more than twice out of 77. To study general trends in 
operating performance levels, we adopted an event study approach by lining up 
years across companies and assessed the changes in business performances levels 
prior to and after private equity investments. We designated the year during which 
the private equity firm made the investment as year t. We also analyzed 
profitability by measuring the variables of return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), and return on sales, while growth was captured by sales growth. We also 
explored the performance metrics of investment activities, leverage, and 
employment, which are represented by the fixed asset ratio, debt-to-asset ratio, and 
the number of employees, respectively. We retrieved accounting data from Kis-
Database for our analysis. Figure 1 shows the trends of private equity investment 
activities in the capital market. Private equity firms increased their investments 
throughout the years from 2006, reaching a total of 77 companies in 2012.  
Looking at the total and yearly trends of private equity investee companies by 
stock market, private equity in Korea invested in KOSDAQ companies grew more 
than twice as much as in that in companies listed on KOSPI, as shown in Figure 2 
and Figure 3. Electric companies and electronic firms were most commonly 
favored by private equity firms, with machinery companies taking second place, 
shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF PRIVATE-EQUITY-BACKED COMPANIES BY YEAR 
 
2We are grateful to the Financial Supervisory Services (FSS) for providing the data. 
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FIGURE 2. TOTAL NUMBER OF PRIVATE-EQUITY-BACKED COMPANIES BY STOCK MARKET 
 
 
FIGURE 3. YEARLY NUMBER OF PRIVATE-EQUITY-BACKED COMPANIES BY STOCK MARKET 
 
 
FIGURE 4. NUMBER OF PRIVATE-EQUITY-BACKED COMPANIES BY INDUSTRY SECTOR 
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IV. Empirical Results 
 
We mainly focused on how the operating performance metrics, in this case the 
profitability and growth of the companies targeted by private equity, changed, with 
an additional assessment of changes with regard to investment activity, leverage, 
and employment. First, we carried out an event study of ROA, ROE, return on 
sales and sales growth using all of the samples and then did this with samples 
winsorized at 5% to limit the influence of potential outliers. We also conducted an 
event study of these variables after adjusting for industry trends to control for 
business cycles and idiosyncratic factors within the industry. In addition, we 
examined whether the individual characteristics of private equity (e.g., investment 
size) may affect the profitability of PE-backed companies through panel 
estimations. Regarding the impact on investment activity, leverage, and 
employment caused by private equity investments, we executed an event study 
focusing on the fixed asset ratio, debt-to-asset ratio, and number of employees. 
Finally, we made use of propensity score matching for 2012, when the number of 
PE-backed companies was highest, to complement the results of the event study 
and to determine the determination rationale of the private equity investments. 
 
A. Operating Performance Results 
 
1. Operating Performance Trends 
 
We examined operating performance trends for the firms in our sample from two 
years before (t-2) to two years after (t+2) private equity investments and carried out 
a t-test to check this statistically and to provide visual evidence. Figures 5 to 8 
show the trends of the mean, 25th quartile, and 75th quartile with regard to ROA, 
ROE, ROS, and sales growth, as well as all of the operating performance metrics 
expressed in terms of the means, showing that they reached a peak t value and then 
decreased afterwards. This implies that private equity firms select companies that 
have a good business before the investment but cannot increase the operating 
performance levels further of these backed firms. Table 1 contains the results of the 
t-tests of changes in operating performance levels between t-1 and t+1, between t-1 
and t+2, between t-2 and t+1, and between t-2 and t+2. We note that the differences 
in operating performance levels compared to the levels one year before the 
investment are all negative and statistically significant, excluding ROE, confirming 
the implications of the visual evidence. The results of a comparison two years 
before the investment (t-2) activity show similar outcomes. 
To determine if our results are robust, we conducted a t-test to assess changes in 
operating performance levels from two years before (t-2) to four years after (t+4) 
private equity investments. As shown in Table 2, the results are qualitatively 
similar to those of the t-test of the outcomes two years after (t+2) the private equity 
investments. 
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TABLE 1—RESULTS OF THE T-TESTS 
t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+2 t-2 to t+1 t-2 to t+2 
ROA -1.109 
(1.893) 
-3.535* 
(1.863) 
-0.599 
(1.926) 
-3.037 
(1.848) 
ROE -0.921 
(6.092) 
-23.173 
(17.662) 
-0.389 
(6.680) 
-23.280 
(18.476) 
ROS -3.110 
(2.360) 
-4.686*** 
(1.550) 
1.839 
(3.978) 
0.303 
(3.348) 
Sales Growth -35.853** 
(17.947) 
-39.104** 
(18.769) 
-24.745* 
(13.017) 
-25.103* 
(13.350) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
TABLE 2—RESULTS OF THE T-TESTS FOR T+4 
t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+2 t-1 to t+3 t-1 to t+4 t-2 to t+1 t-2 to t+2 t-2 to t+3 t-2 to t+4 
ROA 0.430 
(3.277) 
-4.264 
(3.504) 
-6.018**
(2.863)
-3.794 
(3.230)
1.503
(4.081)
-3.192
(3.938)
-4.946 
(4.231) 
-2.722 
(4.299) 
ROE -4.442 
(6.335) 
-53.992 
(38.653) 
-21.091 
(15.733)
-4.619 
(5.434)
115.174
(112.163)
65.624
(119.961)
98.525 
(113.740) 
114.997 
(11.752) 
ROS 0.727 
(3.470) 
-5.580*
(3.185) 
-8.977 
(5.605)
-10.548 
(6.757)
5.839
(6.418)
-0.468
(5.354)
-3.866 
(8.022) 
-5.437 
(9.092) 
Sales Growth -57.233 
(38.665) 
-63.312 
(40.989) 
-67.303
(42.036)
-71.454*
(40.157)
-161.531
(128.944)
-160.636
(129.218)
-160.614 
(129.266) 
-166.420 
(128.603) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
FIGURE 5. TRENDS IN RETURN ON ASSETS 
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FIGURE 6. TRENDS IN RETURN ON EQUITY 
 
FIGURE 7. TRENDS IN RETURN ON SALES 
 
FIGURE 8. TRENDS IN SALES GROWTH 
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2. Trends in Operating Performance Metrics when Controlling for Outliers 
 
Some of the operating performance levels (e.g., ROE and sales growth) show 
different movements among the means and quartiles from earlier figures. We 
conducted an event study of the operating performance levels by making use of 
samples winsorized at 5% to limit the influence of potential outliers. Nearly all of 
the operating performance metrics excluding ROS peaked at period t-1 and showed 
a downward trend afterwards, as shown in Figure 9 through Figure 12, indicating 
that the implication that private equity in Korea had not created value in portfolio 
companies remains accurate. Furthermore, the results of t-tests using the 
winsorized samples in Table 2 more strongly support the outcomes with all of the 
samples. 
 
FIGURE 9. TRENDS IN RETURN ON ASSETS 
Note: ROA is compiled after winsorizing at 5%. 
 
FIGURE 10. TRENDS IN RETURN ON EQUITY 
Note: ROA is compiled after winsorizing at 5%. 
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FIGURE 11. TRENDS IN RETURN ON SALES 
Note: ROA is compiled after winsorizing at 5%. 
 
FIGURE 12. TRENDS IN SALES GROWTH 
Note: ROA is compiled after winsorizing at 5%. 
  
In Table 3, although the gaps in operating performance levels between the 
outcomes one year before and one year after private equity investment and two 
years after private equity investments are negative, the magnitude of the 
performance differences and the statistical strength both show increases over time. 
The statistical test results for two years before investment (t-2) and one year after 
(t+1), and for two years after (t+2) have identical implications with regard to the 
comparison with the outcomes one year before investment (t-1). 
For robustness of our result, running a t-test of changes in operating performance 
levels from two years before (t-2) to four years after (t+4) private equity 
investment, with the results presented in Table 4, confirmed that the results are 
qualitatively similar to those of the t-test of the outcomes two years after (t+2) 
private equity investments. 
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TABLE 3—RESULTS OF T-TESTS USING WINSORIZED SAMPLES 
 t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+2 t-2 to t+1 t-2 to t+2 
ROA -1.198 
(0.769) 
-3.205*** 
(0.854) 
-1.000 
(0.876) 
-2.765*** 
(0.883) 
ROE -4.586*** 
(1.591) 
-6.394*** 
(1.823) 
-2.885 
(1.745) 
-5.528*** 
(1.323) 
ROS -0.884 
(1.087) 
-4.201*** 
(1.110) 
0.543 
(1.768) 
-2.078 
(1.523) 
Sales Growth -13.610** 
(5.870) 
-15.260*** 
(5.471) 
-10.638** 
(4.795) 
-12.527*** 
(4.204) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
TABLE 4—RESULTS OF T-TESTS USING WINSORIZED SAMPLES FOR T+4 
t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+2 t-1 to t+3 t-1 to t+4 t-2 to t+1 t-2 to t+2 t-2 to t+3 t-2 to t+4 
ROA 0.974 
(1.226) 
-2.653* 
(1.464) 
-3.992**
(1.712) 
-2.895 
(1.818)
1.461 
(1.866)
-3.526**
(1.534)
-5.336*** 
(1.799) 
-4.124** 
(1.567) 
ROE -2.730 
(2.790) 
-3.883 
(3.299) 
-12.417***
(3.690) 
-6.978**
(3.318)
-2.835 
(4.326)
-4.691*
(2.348)
-10.849*** 
(3.330) 
-8.785***
(3.074) 
ROS 2.389 
(1.740) 
-3.934 
(2.565) 
-3.332 
(2.121) 
-3.090 
(2.389)
3.766 
(3.323)
-3.098 
(3.312)
-2.608 
(3.391) 
-3.897 
(3.473) 
Sales Growth -8.108 
(8.721) 
-6.502 
(7.323) 
-13.909 
(8.964) 
-11.113 
(9.275)
-10.965 
(8.688)
-13.32 
(9.129)
-16.102 
(9.422) 
-16.307* 
(8.480) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
3. Trends in Operating Performance Levels after Industry Adjustments 
 
The operating performance levels of firms were discovered to be influenced by 
either business cycles or idiosyncratic shocks in each industry for which PE-backed 
companies are associated with private equity (Cohn et al. 2014). For example, 
although the operating performance levels of the target companies deteriorated 
after private equity firms invested in them, private equity had positive effects on 
the target firms when the deterioration of such performance metrics was less than 
the industry average. We conducted an additional event study with industry-
adjusted samples when subtracting the annual averages of the operating 
performance levels for each industry from the operating performance levels of 
individual firms. We calculated the averages of the operating performance levels in 
each industry using Kis-Data up to two digits referring to industrial classification 
codes. ROA, ROE, and sales growth showed the poorest performance levels for 
t+2, although ROS reached a trough at t+1 and rebounded slightly during t+2, as 
shown in Figures 13 to 16. Changes in operating performance levels between t-1 
and t+1 and between t-1 and t+2 are also mostly negative but not statistically 
significant, as shown in Table 5. 
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TABLE 5—RESULTS OF T-TESTS USING INDUSTRY-ADJUSTED SAMPLES 
t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+2 t-2 to t+1 t-2 to t+2 
ROA -10.555 
(9.406) 
-12.158 
(9.349) 
-0.734 
(2.056) 
-2.325 
(1.949) 
ROE 1.986 
(6.475) 
-19.795 
(18.846) 
2.305 
(7.010) 
-20.139 
(19.581) 
ROS -3.689 
(2.911) 
-3.002 
(2.389) 
1.032 
(3.754) 
1.824 
(2.995) 
Sales Growth -16.460 
(20.814) 
-21.189 
(20.216) 
-6.721 
(15.115) 
1.609 
(13.851) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
FIGURE 13. TRENDS IN RETURN ON ASSETS 
Note: ROA is compiled after adjusting for industry. 
 
FIGURE 14. TRENDS IN RETURN ON EQUITY 
Note: ROA is compiled after adjusting for industry. 
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FIGURE 15. TRENDS IN RETURN ON SALES 
Note: ROA is compiled after adjusting for industry. 
 
FIGURE 16. TRENDS IN SALES GROWTH 
Note: ROA is compiled after adjusting for industry. 
 
B. Investment Activity, Financial Stability, and Employment Results 
 
The critics against private equity argue that private equity opportunistically 
attempt to obtain profits in the short-term at the expense of long-term growth 
potentials of the firms they acquire by either stripping assets or reducing 
investments, cutting large numbers of jobs, and raising leverages for tax benefits 
(Capizzi et al. 2014). We examined the effects of private equity on investment 
activity, leverage, and employments for the firms they invest in Korea. 
Accordingly, we conducted an event study with regards to the fixed asset ratio, 
debt ratio, the number of employees, and t-statistical test.  
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Figures 17 through 19 demonstrate the trends of the means, the 25th quartiles, 
and the 75th quartiles for the fixed asset ratio, debt ratio, and employment. The 
fixed asset ratio increased after private equity investments, as shown in Figure 17. 
The debt ratio decreased after private equity investments were made, although 
there was a slight increase from t+1 to t+2. Finally, the condition of employment at 
the targeted firms showed improvements. Visual evidence of this is shown by the 
statistical test results compiled in Table 6. The changes in the fixed asset ratio and 
employment levels between the outcomes one year before and one year after 
private equity investments are positive, while the difference in the debt ratio is 
negative. The statistical test results are pronounced when we test gaps between 
outcomes one year before and two years after the private equity investments. The 
visual and statistical evidence implies that private equity in Korea may not pursue 
benefits for their targeted companies because they sacrifice the long-term growth 
potential of these firms. 
 
TABLE 6—RESULTS OF T-TESTS OF INVESTMENT, LEVERAGE, AND EMPLOYMENT 
t-1 to t+1 t-1 to t+2 t-2 to t+1 t-2 to t+2 
Fixed asset ratio 0.725 
(1.093) 
2.659* 
(1.414) 
0.928 
(1.541) 
2.920 
(1.813) 
Debt ratio -5.988*** 
(2.081) 
-4.851** 
(2.462) 
-2.450 
(2.237) 
-1.433 
(2.633) 
Employees 72.039*** 
(21.681) 
91.809*** 
(28.252) 
45.824 
(63.140) 
57.660 
(70.923) 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
FIGURE 17. TRENDS IN FIXED ASSET RATIO 
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FIGURE 18. TRENDS IN DEBT RATIO 
 
FIGURE 19. TRENDS IN EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
C. Characteristics of Private Equity with regard to  
Operating Performance Results 
 
In section B, we failed to find evidence demonstrating that private equity 
improves the operating performance levels of targeted firms in terms of visual 
metrics and statistical t-tests from the event study. We attempt to uncover hints that 
could explain what may have brought about such poor outcomes in this section. 
Past studies have argued that the effects of private equity on the operating 
performance levels of targeted firms hinge on the characteristics of the private 
equity firms themselves, among other factors (Badunenko et al. 2010; Gompers  
et al. 2015; Harris et al. 2014). For example, private equity with a buyout objective 
is inclined to invest sizable amounts to buy a large portion of the equity for 
management rights, such as 50% of the total equity, compared to firms with a 
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growth capital goal of supporting the financial activities of a growing young 
company, similar to venture capital firms and private equity firms, for which the 
GP has long been assumed to be linked to a high likelihood of success in creating 
value in targeted firms based on the experience and know-how accumulated over 
many years by the investing firm.  
In this study, we estimated the effect of the amount invested by private equity on 
the ROE, which is represented by the operating performance, to determine whether 
private equity in Korea focuses on buyouts or growth capital. The estimation 
equation is as follows: 
 
(1) 1 2 3 4
5 6
  
   
it it it it it
it it it
ROE a b fund size b current ratio b age b asset
b current asset ratio b debt ratio e
     
   
 
We employed ROE as a dependent variable and the current ratio (current asset to 
current liabilities), the age of the firm, assets, the current asset ratio (current asset 
to total asset), and the debt ratio (debt to total asset) as control variables. We 
performed a regression to improve the pooling of the OLS, FGLS, and random 
effects, as this method was found to be a more suitable panel estimation model 
through a Hausman test. 
Table 7 shows the estimation results. We observed that the relationship between 
the amount invested by private equity and the ROE is significantly negative in all 
of our estimation models. That is, the smaller the size of the investment by private 
equity, the better the operating performance is. Furthermore, the younger the firm 
is, the more likely it is for the firm to show higher profitability. This result, along 
with the result showing the negative relationship between the amount invested and 
the operating performance level, imply that Korean private equity firms have not 
been acting as buyout firms, which in general target more mature, underperforming 
firms that need to be restructured. This nonetheless provides growth capital as 
financial resources for young firms to grow. 
 
TABLE 7—RESULTS OF THE ESTIMATION OF THE PE EFFECTS ON  
THE OPERATING PERFORMANCE 
Pooled OLS FGLS Random Effect 
Investment size -5.223** -2.905*** -4.826* 
Current ratio -0.007 -0.006*** -0.007 
Age -0.519** -0.266*** -0.493** 
Asset 11.178*** 5.891*** 10.516*** 
Current asset ratio 0.438*** 0.130*** 0.403*** 
Debt ratio -0.202*** -0.122*** -0.203*** 
Constant -148.634*** -67.809*** -139.936** 
Adjusted R square 0.684 0.680 0.708 
Note: *** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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D. Results from the Propensity Score Matching Estimation 
 
In the previous section, we failed to find critical evidence that substantiates the 
claim that private equity improves the operating performance levels of targeted 
firms, yet there is some visual and statistical evidence that such private equity 
funds do not pursue profits from these firms at the expense of their long-term 
growth potential in terms of investment, financial stability, and employment. 
However, the event study conducted here has limitations in that there was no 
control group. Therefore, we utilize the propensity score matching estimation 
(PSM) model, which has been actively used in policy evaluation studies that share 
this limitation (Heinrich et al. 2010). Propensity score matching selects control 
groups that are most similar to the firms targeted by private equity companies by 
making use of the observable characteristics of these firms. Considering that PSM 
is a cross-sectional estimation method, we use PSM for 2012, the year in which the 
number of investment firms was largest, as an estimation method complementary 
to the event study. By making use of Epanechnikov kernel matching for PSM, we 
explore whether private equity improves the operating performance levels of the 
targeted firms by comparing these companies with the control group. In particular, 
we examine the operating performance levels of the firms for the near future (t+1) 
and the comparatively longer future (t+2) after the investment by private equity. 
 
(2) 
 
1 2 3
4 5
 
    
PE investment
i i i i
it it it
I age current ratio asset
current asset ratio debt ratio
   
  
    
    
 
In the first stage, we estimate the probability of receiving investments from 
private equity funds by running a probit regression. We consider the age of the 
firm, the current ratio, assets, the current asset ratio, and the debt ratio as the 
determinants of investment by private equity funds. Following the selection of the 
investment targets, we calculate the differences in operating performance levels, 
investment activity, financial stability, and employment one year after private 
equity investments have been made. 
 
(3)      1 0  ATE averagetreatment effect E E Y Y     
 
Here, 1 0i i iY Y    is defined as the difference between the potential outcome in 
the case of investment by private equity and the outcomes in the absence of 
investment, and  .E  represents the average. 
The results of the balancing test, by which matching based on the propensity 
score works, are shown in Table 8. The reduction of sample selection bias is 
successful, as no statistically significant variables remain after matching in term of 
the p-values. Table 9 presents the results of the private equity investment 
determination. We found that the probability of receiving investments from private 
equity is higher for larger firms and for younger firms. The outcome showing that 
younger firms are more likely to obtain investments from private equity companies 
implies that private equity favors younger firms with greater growth potential than  
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TABLE 8—RESULTS OF THE BALANCING TEST  
Variable Unmatched Mean Bias(%) Reduction of t-test 
Matched Treated Control bias (%) t p>|t| 
Age U 19.72 27.24 -44.6 52.6 -2.12 0.034 
M 17.26 20.83 -21.1 -0.78 0.440 
Current ratio U 207.69 3,473.50 -3.7 98.4 -0.12 0.902 
M 224.80 227.82 -0.1 -0.23 0.816 
Asset U 26.49 25.87 36.3 91.8 1.90 0.057 
M 26.29 26.24 3.0 0.09 0.928 
Current asset ratio U 25.95 26.78 -3.9 45.5 -0.21 0.833 
M 25.73 25.27 2.1 0.07 0.946 
Debt ratio U 45.43 41.37 18.5 48.0 0.86 0.389 
M 42.91 40.80 9.6 0.31 0.758 
 
TABLE 9—RESULTS OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT DETERMINATION  
Variable Coefficient Standard error P-Value 
Age -0.020** 0.008 0.013 
Current ratio -0.000 0.000 0.418 
Asset 0.117** 0.052 0.024 
Current asset ratio -0.004 0.005 0.441 
Debt ratio 0.004 0.004 0.325 
Constant -4.819 1.314 0.000 
Observation Treatment =22 
Control =1,665 
Note: ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
TABLE 10—RESULTS OF THE AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT (T+1) 
ATE Standard error t-Value 
ROE 5.940 4.734 1.255 
ROA 1.326 2.388 0.555 
ROS -2.212 5.720 -0.387 
Sales Growth -18.650** 8.283 -2.251 
Fixed asset ratio 0.961 5.111 0.188 
Debt ratio 1.895 5.139 0.369 
Employees 123.704 266.685 0.464 
Note: ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
their mature counterparts, which typically require a turnaround through 
restructuring. Looking at the results of the average treatment effect in Table 10, 
sales growth deteriorates with statistically significant negative differences 
compared to the control group, whereas the effect on profitability is not conclusive, 
with mixed signs of negative ROE and ROA and positive but not statistically 
significant ROS outcomes. This implies that we cannot support the claim that 
private equity has the ability to improve the operating performance levels of its 
targeted companies. With respect to the effects on investment, financial stability, 
and employment, private equity may not sacrifice the long-term growth potential of  
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TABLE 11—RESULTS OF THE AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT (T+2) 
ATE Standard error t-Value 
ROE -5.180 16.135 -0.321 
ROA 0.356 1.755 0.203 
ROS 0.304 1.804 0.169 
Sales Growth -6.176* 3.234 -1.910 
Fixed asset ratio 1.125 4.883 0.230 
Debt ratio 2.208 4.824 0.458 
Employees -12.637 174.680 -0.072 
Note: ** Significant at the 5 percent level. 
 
targeted companies for short-term gains considering that changes in the fixed asset 
ratio and number of employees are positive with a slight increase in debt ratio. 
However, we cannot assign any critical meaning to this estimation outcome 
because the results are not statistically significant. The estimation results for the 
longer horizon in Table 11 present qualitatively similar implications. 
 
V. Implications of the Empirical Results 
 
In Korea, private equity was introduced in an effort to foster a native corporate 
restructuring mechanism which could compete with overseas private equity, as 
overseas private equity funds began to rake in money in the domestic corporate 
restructuring market immediately after the currency crisis. Therefore, private equity 
has been considered as pursuing buyouts, taking control of management and 
reforming their targeted companies. However, in reality, private equity funds 
appear to be more akin to growth capital, which provides financial support to funds 
which show growth potential. Based on the results of the empirical analysis, as the 
age of the firm becomes younger, profitability improves among companies targeted 
by private equity firms, as shown in Table 5. Furthermore, private equity appears to 
favor younger companies when it comes to determining their investment portfolios, 
as shown in Table 7. That is, private equity funds, up until recently, took on the role 
of growth capital by supporting the growth of young companies by providing 
financial resources rather than playing a buyout role and turning around mature 
companies that are underperforming. The financial supervisory authority has also 
announced that most private equity funds in Korea are not similar to buyouts funds 
but are more similar to growth capital funds (Financial Supervisory Service 2015). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Recently, corporate restructuring has become a critical issue, especially 
considering the deterioration of the profitability of certain businesses followed by 
years of low growth with increases in the number of marginal firms. The main 
corporate restructuring schemes consist of corporate structure improvements, 
“workouts” by voluntary agreement between creditors, and corporate rehabilitation 
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proceedings or “court receivership” by the courts. This institutional, court-led, ex-
post corporate restructuring process basically targets firms with insolvency issues, 
causing these firms to pay painstakingly high costs, such as significant job losses, 
‘fire sales’, and conflicts of interests among stakeholders. Therefore, as an 
alternative measure, corporate restructuring by the capital market, particularly 
through private equity funds, has gained popularity as an ex-ante, preemptive 
complementary corporate restructuring scheme which takes place before 
insolvency. It is therefore considered to be more effective in that it can reduce 
agency costs by taking control of management and increasing the overall 
monitoring capabilities. Corporate restructuring schemes headed by domestic 
private equity funds are also important in that they can provide some competition 
with overseas private equity funds to prevent the types of cases which arose during 
the currency crises in the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
This study investigates the revitalization of private equity in Korea as an 
alternative corporate restructuring mechanism by empirically analyzing whether 
Korean private equity funds have increased the operating performance levels of 
their targeted firms and by drawing policy implications based on empirical results. 
Whilst the visual and statistical evidence indicates that private equity in Korea may 
not have sacrificed the long-term growth potential of the firms, we also could not 
find evidence that they can improve the profitability (e.g., ROA, ROE, and ROS) 
and growth (e.g., sales growth) of the targeted firms. The results of propensity 
score matching confirm that private equity likely did not increase the operating 
performance levels of targeted companies, as deduced from the results of an event 
study conducted here. Furthermore, we find substantial evidence that the 
relationship between business performance and firm age is negatively correlated 
and that young firms are favored by private equity firms when determining their 
investments. This implies that private equity in Korea does not engage in buyouts, 
which were the original reason given for introducing private equity in Korea, 
taking control of management and executing turnarounds of underperforming 
companies, instead serving as growth capital, providing timely financial resources 
to companies which are relatively young, similar to venture capital firms.  
In addition, we did not find evidence that Korean private equity could improve 
its investee portfolio, which implies that private equity in Korea is not yet ready for 
any corporate restructuring mechanism. We present explanations for this and 
discuss potential policy actions which can be taken to enhance the role of private 
equity firms as a corporate restructuring vehicle based on preceding research and 
on the results of our survey. One of the reasons private equity funds were unable to 
create value in their portfolios is the dearth of sufficient opportunities to build up 
such capabilities. In contrast to the period following the currency crisis, 
underperforming companies may not want to receive investments from private 
equity firms at the expense of its management rights, and with its possession of a 
number of underperforming companies, the government may also crowd out 
investment choices for private equity funds. Furthermore, the history of private 
equity may be too short for private equity firms to have amassed sufficient know-
how and experience with regard to buyouts (Kim and Bin 2012). To invigorate 
private equity as an corporate restructuring scheme, government deregulation is 
needed to foster dynamism and innovativeness in the Korea private equity industry, 
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as regulations pertaining to private equity funds that guide firms towards executing 
buyouts may limit the activities of private equity. Moreover, the private equity 
industry itself should build up capacity by making efforts (e.g., hiring professional 
management teams), and the enlargement of the size of private equity funds is 
necessary to carry out market-friendly corporate restructuring given likely increase 
in the demand for corporate restructuring, in particular for large companies (Koo 
2015).  
Meanwhile this research has some limitations that we would like to leave for 
follow-up studies. First, we are not able to examine whether private equity takes 
part in corporate restricting for targeted firms comprehensively, as we could not 
look at whether private equity disposes of assets and reorganizes the business 
structures of these firms. Second, the present study draws upon data of listed firm 
due to the difficulty in accessing that of non-listed firms. Therefore, this study 
relies on investment data for listed firms through the Financial Supervisory 
Service. Unlike overseas, where detailed data on private equity investments (e.g. 
preqin) are commercially available, such data that include the non-listed firms are 
not available in South Korea.3 Finally, due to data limitations, we could not take 
into account the effect of put-back options on the profitability (e.g., ROE) of 
targeted firms.4 
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